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Between the hammer and the anvil: The impact of economic sanctions and oil prices on Russia's ruble A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
Introduction
Exchange rate fluctuations strongly affect the Russian economy, given its heavy dependence on commodity exports, foreign investment, and imports of consumer goods. Since January 2014, the currency depreciated from about 33 rubles for 1 US dollar to its lowest value of nearly 70 rubles at the end of January 2015. Although
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it has shown a recovery, the exchange rate did not appreciate below 50 rubles for 1 US dollar, as of December 2015. Thus, the ruble lost at least 50% of its value against the US dollar in less than 18 months. The evolution of the ruble exchange rate with respect to the euro is similar; Figure 1 In the most recent period, the ruble recovered a bit faster in euro terms, due to the euro depreciation against the US dollar. The fall of the ruble might be related to economic sanctions against Russia implemented by Western countries to force Russia to return to the status quo before the conflict with the Ukraine. The strong linkages to the Russian economy can likely explain the subsequent decline of currencies of most countries 40 belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Dreger and Fidrmuc (2011) discuss the role of the Russian factor in the earlier evolution of CIS exchange rates.
- Figure 1 about hereMany politicians argued that the introduction of sanctions are appropriate to dry up the military conflict, as they put high economic pressure on Russia. However, the world prices for oil and other natural resources have also fallen since Autumn 2014, partially because of the growth slowdown in the main industrial countries and 45 lower growth perspectives in major emerging markets, such as China and Brazil. Oil supply factors have also been crucial for the development, including the OPEC decision to maintain high production levels and a steady increase in oil production from non-OPEC states, especially in the US due to technological advances. This paper investigates the relative role of political and economic factors in the deterioration of the ruble exchange rate, which is intimately related to the economic performance of Russia.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T diversification is not yet highly developed.
1 For example, two thirds of total exports and more than 50% of budget revenues depend on oil and gas. The strong reliance on commodity exports makes the country extremely vulnerable to shifts in global prices. While GDP growth exceeded 7% in most years of soaring oil prices before the financial crisis, afterwards the expansion was modest due to lower prices for natural resources and increasing 55 difficulties to attract foreign direct investments. With the depreciation of the ruble, growth prospects worsened further. The currency losses led to collapsing government revenues, lower public spending and increasing inflation spurred by higher import prices. Non-oil exports did not benefit much, as the manufacturing sector is still uncompetitive in international markets. Sectoral sanctions may have accelerated the downturn, particularly measures that dry up Russian banks' ability to refinance external debt. This also affects the Russian state,
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which has already started to tap the reserve funds built up during periods of resource price booms.
If the oil price remains low and sanctions are maintained, a serious erosion of reserves is expected, with further consequences on the ability of the government to meet its obligations in a wide range of fields, including pensions and other social securities as well as the military budget. Moreover, restrictions on technology transfer in the energy industry endanger the ability of Russian firms to explore new oil fields and expand production.
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The Russian central bank raised its policy rate several times to fight inflation and capital outflow, causing further downward pressure on domestic consumption and investment. The international confidence that the Russian government can repay its debts eroded, pushing up the sovereign yields to new heights. Against this background, the economic outlook points to a deep recession in Russia for the years ahead. But it is still unclear to what extent the economic sanctions against Russia or the persistent fall in oil prices are the driving forces 70 behind this evolution. Evidence on the relative role of these two factors is highly relevant for policy advice.
Since national accounts data are limited due to publication lags and low reporting frequencies it is difficult to separate the impact of sanctions from the hit due to the slump in oil prices. However, evidence can be built upon exchange rate movements. Due to the daily frequency of the variables, the econometric analysis can refer to a rather short period, i.e., the duration of the conflict without running into a degree of freedom 75 problem. Based on impulse response analysis and variance decomposition, the results indicate that the bulk of the exchange rate depreciation can be attributed to declining oil prices. In addition, unanticipated component
of sanctions matter for the conditional volatility of the variables involved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the main stages of the political conflict between Russia and the Ukraine are reviewed. Section 3 discusses the economic impact of sanctions and measures 80 implemented in 2014. Section 5 presents an overview of the literature applying media information to economic analysis. The use of media data is rather novel in the literature on sanctions. Section 6 describes the data used in the study. Econometric results are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Evolution of the political conflict
Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine has suffered from insufficient and protracted economic reforms,
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high levels of corruption, unclear economic policies, rent seeking, oligarchic industrial structure, as well as from a disadvantageous geographical location between Russia and the European Union (EU). As result of its high dependency from Russia, especially regarding energy imports, and the unwillingness of political elites to introduce acquis communautaire, Ukraine did not join the EU enlargement process. In addition, the halt of EU measures actually adopted appear to be ineffective in many cases. While some studies found that smart 155 sanctions are effective (Morgan and Schwebach, 1995; Cortright and Lopez, 2000) , others found that only harsh measures may trigger a significant impact on policies (Lam, 1990; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003) . In addition, the process of designing sanctions is inherently shaped by powerful groups in the sanctioning countries that serve their own interest (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988) . Game-theoretic models suggest that the success of sanctions further depends on conflict expectations and the levels of commitment. Many sanctions end as a 160 threat, without actually being implemented (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007) .
The impact of sanctions can be measured in terms of economic effects, but also in terms of their policy impact,
i.e., sanctions are considered to be successful if they have led to the desired policy change. By examining a huge set of sanctions, Hufbauer et al. (2009) use of military forces and for the fact that the target country does not make the concessions initially asked for, the share of successful sanctions is significantly lower. In addition, the success rate decreases if the aim of the sanctions is too ambitious, such as introduction of a major policy change. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007) stressed the role of the target size. Larger and self-sufficient countries are able to absorb sanctions more easily than smaller economies. Using a gravity regression approach, Caruso (2003) reported negative effects of 170 economic sanctions on trade. Sanctions may cause higher damage, if they are implemented multilaterally. In case of unilateral sanctions, the target might be able to sell or buy goods and raw materials from third, nonsanctioning countries. Furthermore, sanctions are more likely to fail if there is substantial third party assistance to the target (Bonetti, 1998) . Based on a simultaneous equation approach, Jing et al. (2003) argue that the success of sanctions is positively correlated with the "degree of warmth" in the relations between sanctioner 175 and target prior to the sanctions, negatively correlated with the size of the sanctioner relative to the target, and negatively correlated with economic health and political stability of the target.
Oil prices, sanctions, and exchange rate
A short schematic overview of the literature examining the relation between exchange rate, oil prices, and sanctions is provided in Table 1 . Most papers focus on the effects of oil price fluctuations. There are only two
papers examining the impact of sanctions: Torbat (2005) investigates the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy in a broad sense, while Yahia and Saleh (2008) analyze the links between economic sanctions, oil price fluctuations, and employment in Libya. Thus, only the latter paper considers both sanctions and oil prices.
However, none concentrates on the exchange rate.
In turn, the exchange rate of the ruble is analyzed in two papers: Lizardo and Mollick (2010) (2004) analyzes the impact of oil prices on the Russian economy (GDP), fiscal policy (federal government revenues), and the real exchange rate of ruble using vector autoregression and cointegration techniques. He finds that
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the Russian economy is influenced significantly by fluctuations in oil prices through both long-run equilibrium conditions and short-run direct impacts.
Impact of media on the economy
In order to assess the impact of sanctions vis-à-vis the oil prices on the development of the economy, in addition to the hard data, we use the evidence based on media information. As these data match the daily 195 frequencies of exchange rates and oil prices, the analysis can be done in rather short time intervals without running into degree of freedom problems. Media information also allows the separation between expected and unexpected policy outcomes, i.e., whether sanctions actually implemented were more or less severe than initially expected.
Due to the ever growing body of news and news channels, such as blogs, tweets, and newsletters it is virtually 200 impossible, or at least prohibitively costly, to explore the news using human analysts. Therefore, evidence is based on automated text search, i.e., a simple word count. In fact, such methods are widely applied to predict business cycles and financial markets. Most important, the R-word Indicator for the early detection of turning argues that macroeconomic news increase the volatility of the US dollar vis-à-vis the euro. Asymmetric effects are likely, as US news tend to be more important than European news, and negative news seem to be more influential than positive ones. Furthermore, conflicting news increases exchange rate volatility more and faster than consistent news. Analyzing the impact of Russian-Ukrainian conflict on stock returns in both countries, Hoffmann and Neuenkirch (2015) construct an indicator for the degree of escalation based on an Internet search 225 for conflict related news in international press. The main finding is that conflict intensification reduces Russian and Ukrainian stock returns.
Data
Our data set consists of three types of data: macroeconomic variables, sanction indices, and media data.
Each of these groups is considered in detail in this section.
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Macroeconomic data
The macroeconomic data used in this study are daily time series data on nominal bilateral exchange rates (ruble and US dollar, ruble and euro), Brent oil price, and interest rates for overnight loans in rubles (Ruble OverNight Index Average, RUONIA). Figure 2 displays the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables.
- Figure 2 about here-
The top right panel of Figure 2 shows the oil price dynamics. After achieving high plateau in the first half 235 of 2014, the price dramatically falls in July 2014 and continues falling until the beginning of 2015.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 displays the dynamics of Russian overnight interest rate, RUONIA. It used to be relatively stable at about 8.5%, until December 16th, 2014, when the Central Bank of Russia drastically raised its policy rate from 10.5 to 17%. In its press release the Russian central bank justified the increase by a necessity to fight inflation and devaluation tendencies. 
Sanctions
Based on the information about the sanctions put in action, we constructed two composite sanctions indices:
One for Western sanctions imposed against Russia (S West t ) and another one imposed by Russia against those, who sanctioned it (S Russia t ). For this purpose a complete list of sanctions against and by Russia was compiled, see Tables 2 and 3 .
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A composite sanctions index (say, for sanctions against Russia) is defined here as a cumulative sum of individual sanction dummies, S t :
where r = {West, Russia}; w i is the weight of sanction i; w j is the weight of country j; and s r tij is an indicator function of individual sanction i by/to country j belonging to country group r defined as:
Sanctions are different in terms of their harshness and, hence, their potential effects on the economy and 
Media indices
As a measure of the expectations about potential sanctions we intend to use a news index. It should reflect the frequency of the media items containing information on Russia-related sanctions in the international media.
The news index is constructed based on the number of daily occurrences of words "Russia" and "sanctions" in 270 the printed media of 8 countries (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, the UK, and the USA). A list of media and corresponding search words are reported in Table 4 . The data are used to construct a cumulative composite news index, C t , using the following algorithm:
1. The occurrences in individual media are aggregated at the national level.
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A N U S C R I P T 2. Then, they are scaled by dividing them by the sum of occurrences in 2014. 
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The news index can be seen as a measure of expectations about future sanctions and opinions about already materialized sanctions. Without having access to the full texts of media items it is impossible to identify the context. Therefore, in order to extract expectations from this complex mixture, we regress the news index upon the leads of the two cumulative composite sanctions indices:
The composite media indicator, C t , is regressed on leading values of the indicator for sanctions of the World The fit would be perfect in the case that the sanctions were correctly anticipated by the market. Therefore, the regression residuals,û t , are interpreted as a measure of the bias introduced by the media. Both anticipated 295 and unanticipated sanctions can exert an impact on the evolution of exchange rates. For instance, if the international press expects more extensive sanctions than decided, an overshooting of the ruble exchange rate might be implied.
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Econometric analysis
The variables include the ruble exchange rate against the US dollar, the oil price, and composite indicators Table 5 . 5 The long-run parameters 310 are well signed. In equilibrium, a rise in the oil price and an increase in the RUONIA will lead to a decline in the value of the ruble, i.e., an appreciation against the US dollar. The implementation of Western sanctions is accompanied by a ruble depreciation, while Russian sanctions can compensate this effect.
- Table 5 about here-
The exchange rate elasticity with respect to the oil price exceeds unity, underpinning the important role of the oil price. Compared to this effect, the impacts of the other variables appear to be of minor relevance and for 315 sanctions only marginally significant. This finding suggests that the oil price dominates the sanctions to explain the actual ruble evolution. Tests on weak exogeneity reveal a reasonable adjustment pattern. In particular, the feedback coefficient of the ruble is highly significant, and its negative sign indicates error correction behavior.
Hence, the cointegrating relationship might be interpreted as an equation determining the ruble. According to our estimations based on the feedback coefficient, it would take almost three weeks for a half of the deviation
The results shown in this section are based on the model version with unweighted sanctions. However, the evidence is very similar if weighted sanctions are used instead. The results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
5 It should be noted that the overall time span for the analysis covers only slightly more than one year. Therefore, the interpretation of the cointegration equation as a fundamental long run relationship is ambitious and might be doubted. Nevertheless, this analysis offers additional insights. First, the cointegrating coefficients reveal the dominance of the oil price over sanctions as a driving force of the exchange rate in the period under study. This is also confirmed by the impulse response analysis. Second, the VAR analysis can be safely conducted in levels only for cointegrated time series, which is supported by presented tests.
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from the long-run equilibrium to disappear. The weak exogeneity tests confirm that neither oil prices nor sanctions move to restore the long run. Oil prices are determined in international commodity markets and sanctions by the political process. The hypothesis of joint exogeneity of the three variables cannot be rejected (χ 2 (3)=3.64, p-value 0.303). After implementing the restrictions, the parameter estimates show only small changes.
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- Figure 5 about hereAs confirmed by cointegration tests, the Vector Autoregression (VAR) can be evaluated in levels. In this setup, the long-run relationship is implicitly embedded (Sims et al., 1990) . As a potential drawback, the multipliers are dominated by stochastic trends. Therefore, and to save degrees of freedom, unexpected sanctions are not considered in the impulse responses. However, as discussed below they can be relevant for the stationary VAR component. The impulse responses refer to the five-variables system ( Figure 5 ). Because of multicollinear-330 ity, many of the VAR coefficients are insignificant at conventional levels. As suggested by Sims and Zha (1999), one standard error bands are preferred.
While a rise in oil prices and an increase in the RUONIA will trigger an appreciation of the ruble against the US dollar that will still be visible within 45 working days, the currency is quite robust against shocks arising from the sanctions series. There is a minor positive impact stemming from the Russian sanctions. Combined 335 with the cointegration evidence, this might imply some overshooting of the exchange rate in the short run.
However, the effect is significant only at margin. As a response to a ruble depreciation, the oil price is expected to decline for a few weeks, putting less pressure on the ruble. Again, this response might point to some kind of overshooting of the exchange rate and error correction behavior afterwards. In addition, a depreciation of the ruble causes an increase of the RUONIA, which is broadly in line with the policy pursued by the Central
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Bank of Russia. At least to some extent, the policy was successful, as shown by the response of the ruble to interest rate shocks. Moreover, as higher oil prices put less pressure on the ruble, monetary policy will become less tight.
The sanctions do not play an important role for the other variables in the system, even if standard errors are less tolerant than usual. Spillovers between different types of sanctions are most striking. Sanctions against
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as a positive response of Western sanctions is not detected.
- Table 6 about hereAccording to the impulse-responses, the oil price is much more relevant than the sanctions to explain the development of exchange rate levels. This finding is consistent with the decomposition of the forecast error variance, see Table 6 . Own shocks account for a huge part of the forecast error, especially for the sanctions. As 350 a rule, the weight of the own shock declines with the forecasting horizon. For example, oil prices explain 8%
of the ruble after a week (5 days), but 12 percent after one month has passed. Only 1% of the variance of the ruble forecast errors can be traced to sanctions, even after a month.
Although the sanctions do not significantly alter the course of the ruble, an impact may exist on exchange rate fluctuations. As the VAR length is optimized by the information criteria, the residuals of the system should 355 fulfill the white noise properties or be at least stationary. Thus, the unconditional variance-covariance matrix is constant. This behavior, however, does not have implications on the development of the conditional moments.
Conditional standard deviations could be related to unexpected sanctions, the latter generated according to equation (3).
Conditional moments can be estimated, if the cointegrated VAR is extended by a multivariate Generalized
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Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) process, see Laurent et al. (2006) for a survey of different specifications. Compared to univariate alternatives, the multivariate setup can control for spillovers across the equations. In addition to the conditional variances, conditional covariances can be affected by unanticipated policies. However, the basic insights can be derived if the focus is on the variances.
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Equations describing the dynamics of the conditional variances of the VAR residuals are exhibited in Table   365 7. Along with the GARCH(1,1) structure, the media index is allowed to drive the volatility of the respective variables. In addition to the potential contemporaneous impact of the media, a delay of up to one week (five lags) is allowed. To improve the readability, irrelevant coefficients are omitted. Reported effects are significant, at least at the margin (20% significance level).
- Table 7 about hereAs a principal finding, GARCH effects are relevant in each case. The persistence is particularly striking for 370 6 Detailed results for the multivariate GARCH(1,1) model and conditional covariances can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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A N U S C R I P T the ruble and the oil price errors. In addition, the media do have an impact. While it is hardly significant at conventional levels for the ruble and the RUONIA, the effects are more important for the oil price. If the sanctions turn out to be different than expected, additional volatility will be introduced in international commodity markets. As this might harm real economic growth, policy decisions should be as transparent as possible. Moreover, media affect sanctions positively when their effects are accumulated over time. Thus, 375 if media expect more (less) severe sanctions than actually decided, policymakers are less (more) reluctant to further sanctions. Therefore, media reports have a self-fulfilling component. The results underpin that sanctions are influenced by past forecast errors regarding the political process. This effect is especially visible for Western sanctions, but also relevant for the Russian sanctions.
Conclusions
380
Due to its relative openness and dependence on fuel exports, the Russian economy is heavily exposed to exchange rate fluctuations. Starting in January 2014, the ruble strongly depreciated against the US dollar. The fall of the currency started with the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The impact of the conflict on Russia may be amplified by the sanctions imposed by Western countries. However, oil prices have also declined since summer 2014. As Russia is heavily dependent on natural resource exports, the oil price decline can be another 385 factor behind the currency devaluation.
Using high frequency data on nominal exchange and interest rates, oil prices, actual and unanticipated sanctions, we provide evidence on the driving forces of the ruble exchange rate. The analysis is based on cointegrated VAR models, where fundamental long-run relationships are implicitly embedded. The results indicate that the bulk of the depreciation is caused by the decline of oil prices. In addition, unanticipated 390 sanctions matter for the conditional volatility of the variables involved.
In the absence of a short-term effect of sanctions on the exchange rate of the ruble, they seem to be inappropriate to influence the political course of Russia in the short run. However, this does not imply that the Russian economy will remain unaffected by the Western sanctions. Provided that the sanctions would be kept in force over years, they could weaken the economy of Russia due to their negative effect on investments by domestic and even more by foreign firms in Russia. The experience shows, however, that the long-term A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T sanctions do not necessarily lead to a change in the political course. Thus, the effectiveness of sanctions from the standpoint of settling the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is rather questionable. • US Department of the Treasury, Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx.
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